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Abstract: I draw on neurobiological evidence to defend the rationalist thesis that moral 
judgments are essentially dependent on reasoning, not emotions (conceived as distinct from 
inference). The neuroscience reveals that moral cognition arises from domain-general 
capacities in the brain for inferring, in particular, the consequences of an agent’s action, 
the agent’s intent, and the rules or norms relevant to the context. Although these capacities 
entangle inference and affect, blurring the reason/emotion dichotomy doesn’t preferentially 
support sentimentalism. The argument requires careful consideration of the empirical 
evidence (from neuroimaging to psychopathology) and philosophical analysis of the 
commitments of rationalism versus sentimentalism in ethics. 
 





Moral rationalism is the thesis that ethics is grounded in reason, but the tradition is varied. It is 
typically thought of as a package of views, including the claims that moral judgments are reasoned 
and that moral facts are, like mathematical truths, knowable a priori through pure understanding 
or conceptual competence (Jones & Schroeter 2018). My topic is only the psychological thesis 
about moral judgment and how the burgeoning field of moral neuroscience bears on it.  
Most philosophers and scientists appear to take empirical evidence to preferentially support 
the alternative view, moral sentimentalism, associated with the likes of Adam Smith and David 
Hume, among others. According to a traditional brand of sentimentalism, emotions (conceived as 
distinct from reason) are essential and fundamental to distinctively moral cognition. Experimental 
research seems to suggest that emotions amplify moral judgment and that moral incompetence 
(e.g. in psychopaths) involves emotional deficits. Jesse Prinz (2016: 45-6), for example, interprets 
“the preponderance of empirical evidence as supporting a fairly traditional kind of sentimentalist 
theory of moral judgment” (see also Haidt 2001; Nichols 2004; Sinhababu 2017; Kauppinen 2019).  
Some rationalists have resisted this trend by drawing on work in psychological science but 
little on neurobiology, if at all (Maibom 2005; Kennett 2006; Horgan & Timmons 2007; Sauer 
2017; May 2018a). Perhaps that is because philosophers typically assume that neuroscience—
which only examines the brain’s hardware, so to speak—is unable to illuminate the psychological 
mechanisms and ethical issues (Berker 2009).  
Here I aim to support rationalism by drawing on a broad range of neurobiological evidence. 
I show that the neuroscience, when combined with relevant psychological science and 
philosophical analysis, adds positive evidence that corroborates, illuminates, and strengthens the 
empirical case for moral rationalism. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, although inference 
and affect appear to be entangled in the brain, rationalism is surprisingly well-suited to explain 
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this blurring of the reason/emotion dichotomy (§3). Second, moral cognition appears to arise from 
domain-general capacities in the brain, such as inferring the consequences of an agent’s action and 
the agent’s intent (§4). I conclude that rationalism is not only consistent with the resulting picture 
of the moral brain but provides a rather satisfying account of it (§5). Analyzing the empirical 
evidence, however, requires first clarifying the commitments of the two camps (§2).  
 
2. Rationalism vs. Sentimentalism in Ethics 
2.1 The Classical Theories 
Rationalism and sentimentalism are such broad traditions in ethics that any characterization of 
them will inevitably be unsatisfying to some parties in the debate. Recognizing these constraints, 
we’ll consider some traditional forms of these theories with the acknowledgement that they can be 
modified and updated in light of improved understandings of the human mind. Indeed, the aim 
here is to provide a version of rationalism that coheres with moral neuroscience, even if updated 
versions of sentimentalism are available. We begin with such classical formulations of the theories. 
Sentimentalists have traditionally suggested that moral judgments are like judgments of 
beauty in requiring certain emotional responses (Gill 2007). You don’t need any emotional 
reactions to the thought that “Tehran is the capital of Iran” in order to accept it, and the same goes 
for the mathematical thought that “To infer the length of a right triangle’s hypotenuse from the 
length of its other sides, one ought to use the Pythagorean theorem.” But it’s hard to imagine truly 
believing that “Yosemite valley is breathtakingly beautiful” without ever having that distinctive 
feeling of awe that it inspires. Similarly, without feelings of compassion or indignation, 
sentimentalists think it impossible to truly make particular moral judgments about helping others 
in need or rectifying social injustices. Some sentimentalists go so far as to say that moral judgments 
are “constituted by emotional states” (Prinz 2016: 46; see also D’Arms & Jacboson 2014: 254; 
Tappolet 2016: 79). At a minimum, however, defenders of the psychological thesis of 
sentimentalism traditionally contend that moral cognition is fundamentally caused by such 
emotional responses (Nichols 2004: 83; see also Kauppinen 2018). 
In contrast, proponents of rationalism traditionally define the view in terms of reasoning 
and rationality. Moral judgment, it is said, fundamentally “derives from our rational capacities” 
(Kennett 2006: 70), is ultimately “the culmination of a process of reasoning” (Maibom 2010: 999), 
or is “fundamentally an inferential enterprise that is not ultimately dependent on non-rational 
emotions, sentiments, or passions” (May 2018a: 7). Emotions, according to rationalists, are either 
merely the natural consequences of reasoning or provide just one way of instigating or facilitating 
reasoning or inference, which of course can be downright irrational while being part of our 
“rational capacities.”  
These characterizations of the traditional debate might seem to rely on a sharp 
reason/emotion dichotomy, which has been duly questioned (more on this below). However, we 
can preserve a classical dispute by asking whether the affective elements of moral emotions are 
necessary for moral judgment (or, more broadly, normative/evaluative judgments about what one 
should do). Sentimentalists maintain that moral judgments are special in requiring emotions in a 
way that other forms of cognition don’t, such as judgments about mathematics, geography, or 
language. Consider how the issue is discussed by Hume. He says certain topics are the objects of 
reason while others the objects of feeling. To make the point that morality is special in being an 
object of feeling, he asks us to consider any vicious action and to look for a “matter of fact” that 
makes it vicious:  
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The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object [the person with the vice]. 
You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment 
of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but ‘tis 
the object of feeling, not of reason. (1739–40/2000: 3.1.1)  
 
Of course, as Hume emphasizes elsewhere, reasoning is involved in making such moral judgments. 
But sentimentalists will maintain that it’s the feelings, the affective elements of moral emotions, 
that are essential for and distinctive of moral cognition. Sentimentalists have not traditionally 
argued that feelings are required for understanding right from wrong because feelings are required 
for all knowledge. Put another way, imagine a company aims to build military androids or 
autonomous vehicles with knowledge of mathematics but also of ethics, so that the AI can properly 
navigate moral dilemmas and avoid atrocities. Or imagine a science-fiction writer who is trying to 
construct a plausible fictional species from a distant galaxy who knows right from wrong and yet 
has a mind that differs in other respects from human psychology. Although the machines or 
fictional species might be able to make moral judgments of a sort, sentimentalists typically regard 
the resulting judgments as derivative at best. Their predicament would be analogous to how a 
congenitally blind person can judge that ripe bananas are yellow by relying on the visual 
experiences of others (Prinz 2006: 32). Unlike knowledge of mathematics, ethical knowledge is 
ultimately grounded in moral emotions (e.g. compassion, indignation), whether experienced by 
oneself or others.  
Rationalists, on the other hand, would insist on treating both kinds of knowledge similarly. 
While ethics is a distinct domain, it too deploys domain-general mechanisms of reasoning or 
inference, whether conscious or unconscious. An android must of course possess moral concepts 
in order to make moral judgments—just as it would have to possess mathematical concepts, like 
addition and hypotenuse, in order to make mathematical judgments—but emotions aren’t 
necessary for possessing the concepts. Rationalists of course will admit that humans are emotional 
creatures and that these emotions help to quickly draw our attention to morally relevant 
information. But their view implies that a creature with unlimited time and resources needn’t 
possess emotions in order to make distinctively moral judgments (cf. Jones 2006: 3). Indeed, 
rationalists can and should predict that morality isn’t special: emotions, affect, and feelings do aid 
reasoning generally, across a wide range of subject matters or domains of thought, from morality 
to mathematics. That prediction, I’ll argue, looks to be supported by our best understanding of 
moral cognition in the human brain.  
 
2.2 The Terms 
Some important clarifications are in order. First, although the paradigm of reasoning is conscious 
deliberation, we must resist the urge to identify reasoning with this narrow class of mental 
phenomena. Otherwise we unfairly saddle rationalists with the daft thesis that moral judgment is 
fundamentally driven by slow, conscious deliberation that is entirely bereft of feeling (May & 
Kumar 2018). Instead, we will charitably interpret the rationalist tradition as maintaining that 
moral judgment is fundamentally a matter of inference. Although inference needn’t be conscious, 
it is more than mere information processing or computation. Inference is commonly understood as 
the process of forming beliefs (or belief-like states) on the basis of other such states, whether 
consciously or unconsciously (Boghossian 2012; Siegel 2017: ch. 5; Buckner 2019). For example, 
you conclude (form the belief) that your date is trustworthy on the basis of your perceptions of his 
demeanor, affectations, and relevant behavior toward you and others. A complete analysis of “on 
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the basis of” has proven elusive. Inference requires more than your existing attitudes merely 
causing you to form a new belief through, say, mere priming or association. But must you believe 
or recognize that your conclusion is supported by the evidence? We needn’t provide a definitive 
answer here, but instead only assume what is uncontroversial: that conscious recognition isn’t 
required. Otherwise too many genuine instances of inference are ruled out. 
Of course, moral judgment involves inference applied to decision and action, not merely 
abstract theoretical reasoning. An android would probably be incapable of full-fledged moral 
judgment if it is merely imbued with reasoning and lacks any behavior, goals, or desires. However, 
inference mediates not only prospective deliberation but unconscious learning. Rationalists would 
expect the android to acquire moral judgment if we put it in an environment with other social 
creatures along with domain-general learning capacities, including theory of mind, calculation of 
outcomes, and the ability to categorize act types as being consistent with or violating general rules 
or norms. Rather than model moral cognition on reasoning through a mathematical proof, modern 
rationalists take a page from recent advances in artificial intelligence that use deep learning 
algorithms to model human cognition, in ethics and elsewhere (Malle & Scheutz 2019; Haas 2020).  
Second, the form of rationalism I defend is non-partisan regarding neighboring issues about 
the reliability or rationality of moral judgments. Like the android, humans have goals and desires, 
which can lead to wishful thinking, confirmation bias, and post-hoc rationalization. Yet 
problematic forms of inference are inference nonetheless. Thus, the neuroscience reveals a role for 
reasoning that is compatible with both attempts to debunk (Greene 2013) and to vindicate (Kumar 
& May 2019) commonsense moral intuitions.  
Finally, amid the replication crisis in science, we shouldn’t be overly credulous when 
drawing on scientific research, whether the discipline is a natural or social science (Machery & 
Doris 2017; May 2021). We’ll see that the argument here is based on more than a small set of 
studies or methods from a single lab. Moreover, the research involves more than brain imaging 
(and problematic “reverse inferences”) or moral dilemmas, such as the trolley problem, which 
might be too artificial or unrealistic to serve as the sole measure of everyday moral cognition.  
 
3. Step 1: The Entanglement of Inference and Affect 
Early work in moral neuroscience seemed to reveal the centrality of emotion, a point emphasized 
by some sentimentalists (e.g. Prinz 2016). However, as we’ll see, this work also calls into question 
the common distinction between reason and emotion, revealing that apparently “emotional” 
processes are important not just for moral cognition but for reasoning generally, outside of the 
moral domain. This result is not only consistent with the tradition of rationalism but predicted by 
it and in conflict with classical forms of sentimentalism. The entanglement of inference and affect 
has been most exemplified in neurological disorders and brain damage. Here I focus on two key 
cases: psychopathy and so-called “acquired sociopathy.”   
 
3.1 Psychopathy 
First consider how both affective and rational deficits are entangled in the abnormal moral thought 
and behavior of psychopaths. Psychopathy (sometimes referred to as “sociopathy”) is roughly 
what’s labeled “anti-social personality disorder” in the latest Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders. Among other vices, psychopaths are characteristically callous, shameless, 
remorseless, and exhibit a superficial charm that allows them to manipulate others who are often 
ultimately left battered or destitute. These symptoms do appear to contribute to some 
misunderstanding of right and wrong. Some, though not all, inmates with psychopathy have 
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difficulty distinguishing moral rules from mere conventions (Aharoni et al. 2012); others struggle 
to properly deploy moral concepts and reasons in conversation—e.g., misusing words like “guilt” 
and “feeling bad” about a crime (Hare 1993; Kennett & Fine 2008).  
Most psychopaths aren’t serial killers, although they commonly have run-ins with the law. 
Hare (1993: 91) describes one case, for example, in which a man with psychopathy broke into 
what he thought was an empty home but found an irate resident inside who wouldn’t “shut up.” 
Instead of fleeing, the burglar calmly beat the elderly man unconscious, then took a nap on the 
sofa, only to be woken up later by police. Such senseless aggression and instrumental irrationality 
are common in psychopathy (Maibom 2005).  
The disorder seems to arise primarily from dysfunction in at least two key areas of the brain 
and their connectivity (Blair 2007; Kiehl 2006). First is the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC), which is roughly the inner underside of the “prefrontal” cortex (the front of the frontal 
lobe). The vmPFC overlaps with a similar anatomical region behind the eye sockets (or “orbits”), 
the orbitofrontal cortex. The frontal lobe generally subserves our ability to plan and make complex 
choices, and these specific portions of the prefrontal cortex behind the eyes seem to house the gut 
feelings that guide judgment and decision-making (more on this in the next section). The second 
main area of dysfunction in psychopathy is the amygdala, a pair of small almond-shaped nodes 
deep in the brain. These nodes, along with the limbic system of which they’re a part, have 
classically been associated with emotion, particularly fear. But we now know they are involved 
more broadly in assessing the significance of an object or event—e.g., whether it’s valuable or 
threatening. The amygdala is thus a region crucial for many processes of learning in light of 
rewards or punishments, and dysfunction early in development naturally leads to a host of 
cognitive and behavioral problems. Proper development of the vmPFC and amygdala is never fully 
achieved for individuals with psychopathy, for a variety of reasons. Part of the explanation is 
genetic, such as mutations that disrupt neurotransmitters, but other important factors include 
adverse circumstances like neglect, childhood trauma, and even exposure to lead (Kiehl & Sinnott-
Armstrong 2013; Glenn & Raine 2014).  
Many theorists have remarked that psychopaths seem to be in some sense rational, at least 
in their general understanding of the world and how to go about manipulating it. A common 
analysis is that psychopaths thus demonstrate the necessity of emotions for understanding right 
from wrong (e.g. Haidt 2001; Nichols 2004; Prinz 2016). However, psychopathy exhibits the 
entanglement of inference and affect in moral cognition. Deficits in feeling guilt and compassion 
are accompanied by numerous rational deficits—poor attention span, delusions of grandeur, and 
difficulty learning from punishment (Maibom 2005; May 2018a). The impairments are broadly in 
learning and inference, commonly experienced early in life, which prevent patients from properly 
understanding and internalizing habits and strategies for ethical and prudential decision-making. 
Indeed, as we’ll see in the next section, adults who acquire damage to areas like the vmPFC later 
in life, after such areas have already developed properly, display markedly different psychological 
profiles (Anderson et al. 1999; Taber-Thomas et al. 2014). 
 
3.2 “Acquired Sociopathy” 
A similar demonstration of the entanglement of inference and affect arises from lesions of the 
vmPFC in adults. This area of the prefrontal cortex appears to be roughly the site of damage in 
Phineas Gage, the railroad worker whose tamping iron rocketed through his frontal lobe in 1848. 
The details of that famous case are fraught, but we know much more now about individuals who 
have suffered damage to this area in adulthood.  
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Patients with vmPFC damage often develop what Antonio Damasio (1994) dubs “acquired 
sociopathy.” This label is confusing, however, since the clinical profile is quite different from that 
of psychopathy. Far from callous or remorseless, adults who acquire damage to the vmPFC 
primarily suffer from poor decision-making that is not necessarily antisocial or harmful to others. 
These patients appear instead to have a shortage of gut feelings that help guide decisions about 
what to do in the moment. Compared to neurotypical individuals, patients have difficulty making 
a wide range of decisions, from how to rack up points in a card game to which variety of apples to 
purchase at the grocery store. Consider two patients as examples:  
• Elliot, one of Damasio’s (1994: ch. 3) patients, had an orange-sized tumor that originated 
near his nasal cavity. Removal of the tumor resulted in damage to his frontal lobe (primarily 
orbital and medial portions). After surgery, Elliot remained intelligent in many respects but 
struggled with all manner of planning and decision-making. He was eventually fired from 
his job because he could no longer stay on task and properly manage his time. His 
relationships suffered as well from what some described as his foolish and irrational 
behavior, leading to multiple marriages and divorce. 
• Tammy Myers presents a similar form of decision-making deficit. After a motorcycle 
accident damaged her orbitofrontal cortex, Tammy reports that “she often spends all day 
on the sofa” because even simple decisions about what to do next are agonizing (Eagleman 
2015: 119).  
Patients with such brain damage retain many of their intellectual capacities. They tend to give 
typical responses about how one ought to make hypothetical choices (Saver & Damasio 1991). 
The deficit rather concerns decisions about what to do oneself in a particular situation (Kennett & 
Fine 2008). A patient might recognize that it’s healthier to buy organic fruits, but what should she 
do right now when the non-organic Opal apples this season taste divine? Although similar decision 
paralysis crops up in social situations too, the deficit is domain-general. 
These decision-making deficits appear to affect patients’ rationality. But Damasio (1994) 
and many others following him attribute the deficit in decision-making to “somatic markers” that 
help us to settle on decisions that feel right. The absence or attenuation of a patient’s gut feelings 
thus impairs one’s ability to choose among competing options. However, as Damasio emphasizes, 
acquired sociopathy exemplifies the entanglement of inference and affect in decision-making 
generally.  
Indeed, later research suggests that the vmPFC is itself unlikely a source of gut feelings 
but rather a hub wherein such feelings are incorporated with or weighed against other 
considerations to then form a decision (Shenhav & Greene 2014; Hutcherson et al. 2015; Salzman 
& Fusi 2010; Woodward 2016). Other lines of research suggest that the amygdala and vmPFC in 
mammals facilitate certain forms of reinforcement and statistical learning that are largely 
unconscious (e.g., Hare et al. 2008) and can be applied to moral judgment among other domains 
(Cushman 2013; Crockett 2016; Nichols 2021). It’s no wonder that patients with damage to the 
vmPFC struggle to make decisions. It’s not because they lack knowledge of right and wrong or 
are unable to form moral judgments whatsoever; rather absent or attenuated gut feelings impair 
their ability integrate their values into an overall decision about what to do right now in these 
particular circumstances. 
 
3.3 Entanglement & Rationalism 
If the reason/emotion dichotomy is blurry, then this might seem to trivialize the debate between 
rationalists and sentimentalists. However, the entanglement of inference and affect doesn’t support 
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the traditional sentimentalist thesis that, unlike other forms of judgment, moral judgment requires 
moral emotions such as anger, compassion, guilt, and disgust. Rather, the emerging picture is that 
twinges of affect are necessary for all forms of cognition, from judgments about ethics to 
judgments about which apples to purchase (Huebner 2015; Seligman et al. 2016). Indeed, a 
growing consensus in neurobiology is that “affect is a form of cognition” (Duncan & Barrett 2007), 
such that even if, say, the amygdala gives rise to affect, such feelings facilitate inference generally. 
The consensus comports with the classical rationalist thesis that moral cognition isn’t special; it 
involves affect in just the way that other forms of inference do. It’s perfectly consistent with 
rationalism to hypothesize that emotions draw one’s attention to morally relevant information, as 
some sentimentalists have recognized (e.g. Prinz 2006: 31). The debate might break down if 
contemporary sentimentalists abandon the idea that moral or evaluative judgment is special in 
requiring emotions. Then both camps might happily embrace the entanglement of inference and 
affect, but a dispute remains intelligible between more traditional views.  
 Classical sentimentalists might argue that the amygdala and vmPFC provide the crucial 
affective or emotional element that makes for a distinctively moral judgment, or more broadly 
normative/evaluative judgments about what one should or shouldn’t do. But that’s not quite right, 
for several reasons.  
First, if we focus on full-blown moral emotions like compassion and moral disgust, the 
reason/emotion dichotomy isn’t so blurry. Experimental and anecdotal evidence suggests that such 
rich moral emotions are commonly the effects, not causes, of moral judgments. Often one only 
feels compassion for a group of people, such as immigrants, if one antecedently judges them to be 
unfairly disadvantaged or deserving of sympathy (Betancourt 1990). And we feel repugnance 
toward those acts we antecedently deem immoral (Plakias 2018; May 2018b). In a set of 
electroencephalography (EEG) studies, for example, carefully time-locked recordings of 
participants’ brain waves suggest that they first judge an action to be moral or immoral and then, 
milliseconds later, judge the act to be disgusting or not (Yang et al 2013; 2014). Of course, 
emotions can be recalcitrant in the face of changes in moral judgments—e.g., one might not 
become disgusted by the consumption of animal flesh, even after judging it to be immoral. Yet 
people who become vegetarians for moral, as opposed to health, reasons are apparently more likely 
to become disgusted by meat (Rozin et al. 1997). In this way, emotions often fall in line with the 
new moral belief, as when anger toward your partner eventually fades after realizing her remarks 
weren’t disrespectful. So, even if one’s moral judgments arise from learning and inference that is 
suffused with affect, this entanglement is no consolation for classical sentimentalism when there 
remains a dichotomy between the reasoned judgment and the full-blown moral emotions that 
result. In other words, although the science militates against a dichotomy between inference and 
affect, the evidence speaks in favor of distinguishing to some degree reasoned moral judgments 
from moral emotions (and in a way that is compatible with a rationalist model). 
Sentimentalists might focus less on distinctively moral emotions and more on how twinges 
of affect ground more broadly normative, evaluative, or practical judgments about what one should 
do, whether it concerns the appropriateness of white lies or green apples. After all, Hume did argue 
that passion drives not only moral judgment but all action by providing evaluative content—e.g., 
that white lies are acceptable or that the Granny Smith apples are a worse option than the Opals. 
Without proper function of the amygdala or vmPFC, one might argue, we could not even assign 
value to an object or event (Railton 2017; Carruthers 2018).  
However, affect is not specific to judgments about what’s best to do. All manner of 
cognition is suffused with affect, including attention, visual experience, memory encoding and 
Page 8 of 20 
retrieval, and semantic processing (Duncan & Barrett 2007; Hohwy 2013: ch. 12; Woodward 2016; 
Seligman et al. 2016; Carruthers 2018). Although we’ve focused on patients with deficits in 
decision-making, we could illustrate the ubiquity of affect by discussing patients with delusions 
or perceptual irregularities due to affective impairment in areas like the amygdala and vmPFC. 
Individuals with Capgras syndrome, for example, tend to lack the feeling of familiarity when 
seeing the faces of loved ones and thus claim that their family members have been replaced with 
imposters. These patients’ brains appear to suffer from poor communication between the amygdala 
and face-processing areas in the temporal lobe (see e.g. Hirstein & Ramachandran 1997). In 
neurotypical individuals, by contrast, affect seems to provide significance and meaning to the 
visual experience of familiar faces, which facilitates the inference to another person’s identity. In 
this way, affect doesn’t specifically underwrite decision or action in the brains of humans (and 
other animals) but rather a broad notion of significance, from the meanings of words to the 
familiarity of faces or places. These are domains of cognition that sentimentalists have traditionally 
aimed to distinguish from morality, aesthetics, and prudence. 
At any rate, problems arise for classical sentimentalism even if we concede that affect is 
emotional and indeed that it provides as input the distinctive value component to evaluative 
judgment. As sentimentalists themselves have been quick to point out (e.g. Nichols 2004), value 
alone is neither specific to nor sufficient for moral judgment. Humans and many other animals use 
their amygdala and frontal cortices to assign positive and negative values to many types of non-
moral events, such as wildfires and levers that yield a food reward. Sustenance is often good and 
wildfires are often bad, but they aren’t always morally wrong or the best thing to bring about. 
Casualties, property damage, and habitat loss are intrinsically bad and disvalued, but it might be 
better, all things considered, to avoid nuclear war than stop the wildfire. Similarly, attaining food 
might be intrinsically valued, and so rewarding, yet a rat will refrain from eating because it more 
greatly fears the punishment it has learned to associate with eating from a particular trough. What’s 
missing—and what’s essential to moral judgment—is something like the application of a rule or 
similar categorization, which doesn’t seem to be captured by valuation alone.  
Now, the defense of rationalism so far may seem weak if it turns out that moral cognition 
is in some respects special. Perhaps it is supported by a dedicated module that involves more affect 
than inference. In the next section, however, we’ll see that converging evidence suggests that moral 
cognition is supported by a spatially distributed network of brain regions that engage in domain-
general processes that are arguably inferential. 
 
4. Step 2: Domain-General Reasoning 
So far, we’ve seen that moral judgment is at least subserved by two brain regions often associated 
with emotion: the amygdala and vmPFC. However, an improved understanding of these and other 
areas suggests that the “emotion” here is largely unconscious twinges of affect which facilitate 
many cognitive functions, including learning and reasoning. The entanglement of inference and 
affect reveals the centrality of reasoning in moral judgment, even if it is often automatic and 
unconscious. The neurobiological support for moral rationalism, however, is not yet complete, for 
there is more evidence to consider. In this next step, we’ll examine further research that reveals a 
more complete picture of the moral brain. What emerges is a set of regions that subserve general 
rational capacities, ones we’d antecedently expect to be deployed in ethical thought.  
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4.1 Inferring Intent 
There are multiple methods one can use to study different aspects of moral judgment, and we’ll 
encounter a number of different approaches. Let’s begin with moral evaluations of accidental 
versus intentional harms. We often evaluate the morality of an action by whether it caused harm, 
but the adage “No harm, no foul” only applies in limited circumstances. As with attempted murder, 
malicious intent can be enough to make an act morally objectionable (indeed criminal), even if it 
ultimately caused no harm. Similarly, even when there is a terrible outcome, such as a 
heartbreaking loss of life, we judge the culprit less harshly if the harm was accidental, even if 
negligent. In this way, intent interacts with outcomes to influence many moral judgments. 
Although assessing intent isn’t the only core aspect of ethical reasoning (Graham et al. 
2013; Young & Saxe 2011; Parkinson et al. 2011), it is, to some degree or other, commonplace in 
moral cognition across most societies (Barrett et al. 2016; McNamara et al. 2019). It’s part of a 
general capacity for inferring the mental states of other individuals or “theory of mind” (Decety & 
Lamm 2007; Young & Dungan 2012), which is primarily subserved by two overlapping brain 
areas: the temporoparietal junction or posterior portions of the superior temporal sulcus 
(TPJ/pSTS). Naturally, researchers have hypothesized that this circuit is involved in reasoning 
about intent in moral judgment. 
To test this, participants evaluated hypothetical, yet realistic, scenarios in which intent and 
outcome varied. The vignettes involve someone who harms another accidentally or intentionally 
or merely attempts to do so (see Table 1). For example, in one of the Attempted Harm cases, Grace 
and her friend are touring a chemical plant when Grace puts what she believes is a toxic substance 
in her friend’s coffee, though in fact it’s sugar. Would the temporoparietal junction be more active 
than other brain areas while participants evaluated such scenarios in the scanner? The answer, as 
predicted, is yes, and the TPJ is most active when evaluating cases of merely attempted harm, 
where there is no bad outcome and a negative moral judgment rests heavily on the agent’s 
malicious intent (Young et al. 2007; Young & Saxe 2008).  
 
Table 1: Summary of Vignettes that Vary Intention and Outcome  
(Adapted from Young et al. 2007) 
 Negative Outcome Neutral Outcome 
Negative  
Intention 
Intentional Harm:  
Grace believes the substance is 
poison and it is poison (so her 
friend dies). 
Attempted Harm:  
Grace believes the substance 




Accidental Harm:  
Grace believes the substance is 
sugar but it is poison (so her 
friend dies). 
Neutral:  
Grace believes the substance 
is sugar and it is sugar (so her 
friend lives). 
 
Of course, such neuroimaging studies only provide correlations between moral judgment 
and brain circuits. But further research provides reason to believe that the TPJ is causally 
implicated in such moral cognition. In particular, evaluations of merely attempted harms are less 
harsh when the TPJ is disrupted non-invasively through transcranial magnetic stimulation (Young 
et al. 2010). Moreover, moral judgments about such scenarios appear to be somewhat abnormal in 
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individuals with autism, a condition with characteristic deficits in theory of mind (Moran et al. 
2011; see also Koster-Hale et al. 2013).  
Importantly, theory of mind is a domain-general capacity. It can be deployed in areas well 
beyond ethics, such as learning to dance with a partner or figuring out how to intimidate an 
opponent on the football field. So there is converging neurobiological evidence that the TPJ, with 
its domain-general mind-reading abilities, plays a key role in a core form of moral assessment. 
This, of course, is just one relevant domain-general capacity in moral cognition and, accordingly, 
only one key brain circuit.  
  
4.2 Applying Rules, Calculating Consequences 
Another paradigm in moral neuroscience examines how we trade off different values in the context 
of moral dilemmas. In these sacrificial dilemmas, one must indicate whether it is morally 
appropriate to promote the greater good (e.g., stopping a runaway trolley from harming multiple 
individuals) at the expense of inflicting harm on the few (e.g., stopping the trolley requires pushing 
a single large person in front of it). Although the famed trolley problem is a common vignette in 
this literature, it’s important to recognize that researchers employ other more realistic sacrificial 
dilemmas as well, such as a scenario in which one can encourage the use of a vaccine that will 
harm some citizens but save many others (see the “Vaccine Policy” case in the supplemental 
materials of Greene et al. 2001). Here we see a classic conflict in ethics between utilitarian or 
consequentialist concerns about outcomes and non-consequentialist concerns about upholding 
general rules or principles, such as those that prohibit treating others as if they were mere objects 
to be used as a means to one’s ends.  
 Joshua Greene and his collaborators suspected such moral conflicts arise from another 
domain-general system, or rather two systems, in the human brain. According to the familiar dual-
process theory of cognition, humans have two rather different modes of thought. One generates 
fast, automatic, intuitive judgments while the other produces slow, reflective, deliberations—
“thinking, fast and slow,” as Kahneman (2011) puts it.  
We can see this in action across all of human cognition, from language to mathematics and 
even social norms. Consider, for example, a famous mathematical problem on the Cognitive 
Reflection Test: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost?” (Frederick 2005). The intuitive answer is 10 cents, but some deliberation 
should yield 5 cents. The same tension in thought arises in other domains as well, such as social 
norms related to naming: “Emily’s father has three daughters. The first two are named April and 
May. What is the third daughter’s name?” (Thomson & Oppenheimer 2016). (Test yourself: Which 
is the automatic intuitive response and which is the correct response you get upon reflection?) The 
phenomenon is not restricted to word problems either. Consider, finally, the well-known Stroop 
task in which one is instructed to name the ink color that a series of color-words are written in (e.g. 
“red” written in purple), rather than name the meaning of the word (Stroop 1935). Modern literate 
people are so habituated to reading words that they must deliberately override the automatic 
impulse when faced with this task, and thus they must slow down to avoid mistakes. Other 
linguistic capacities likewise become habitual or automated, including the ability to discern the 
grammaticality of sentences in one’s native language (Mikhail 2011). These linguistic examples 
show that intuitive responses are not necessarily unlearned, innate intuitions but often based in 
large part on prior experience, habit, and cognitive automation, through both conscious and 
unconscious inference. Indeed, if one practices enough, the Stroop task and Cognitive Reflection 
Test become less arduous.  
Moral Rationalism on the Brain 
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Specific neural circuits appear to be dedicated to these two systems of thought. Although 
a number of brain areas are involved, two of the key players reside next to each other in the 
prefrontal cortex. One of these, the vmPFC, which we’ve already encountered, is linked to 
automatic intuitive responses. The other, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), is associated 
with slow deliberation and the regulation of automatic thoughts (Miller & Cohen 2001; McClure 
et al. 2004). Importantly, these are domain-general functions that can be applied to judgments or 
decisions about grammar, social norms, math problems, and more.  
The insight from Greene and his collaborators was that moral cognition likely exhibits the 
same dual-system characteristics, particularly when we evaluate moral dilemmas. Moreover, the 
researchers provide evidence that responses to such moral dilemmas invoke the usual cast of neural 
circuits in dual process theory (Greene et al. 2001; 2004). When participants gave automatic 
intuitive responses to a moral dilemma (don’t sacrifice the few for the greater good), they exhibited 
elevated activity in the vmPFC, as well as the amygdala, pSTS/TPJ, and the posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC). Heightened activation in the PCC is unsurprising given that it’s associated with, 
among other functions, resolving conflicts. When participants provided the counter-intuitive 
response to a moral dilemma (the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few), they exhibited 
greater activity in the dlPFC, as well as the pSTS/TPJ/inferior parietal lobe (but compare Kahane 
et al. 2012).  
Now, Greene (2014) argues further, and more controversially, that these two brain areas 
and modes of cognition are tied to specific forms of moral values (characteristically utilitarian vs. 
non-utilitarian moral judgments). However, for our purposes, it is only important to show that core 
forms of moral judgment recruit the sorts of brain areas implicated in two domain-general modes 
of cognition—moral thinking, fast and slow. In the context of moral judgment, the dlPFC may be 
more involved in calculating the outcomes of an action while the vmPFC may help apply general 
moral rules (or assigning values to act types). But we needn’t construe these processes as 
characteristic of certain ethical theories. 
Greene (2014) does marshal a wide range of neurobiological evidence to support this dual-
process architecture of moral cognition in the brain. Importantly, some of the evidence goes 
beyond mere correlations found in brain imaging experiments, by drawing on lesion studies and 
the manipulation of slow, deliberate moral thinking. Consider, for example, studies of the moral 
judgments of people with deficits in their automatic emotional responses to ethically charged 
situations, such as individuals with psychopathy, damage to the vmPFC, and frontotemporal 
dementia (Koenigs et al. 2012; Koenigs et al. 2007; Mendez et al. 2005). As the dual-process 
model predicts, these patients tend to give more counter-intuitive responses to the sacrificial 
dilemmas (although it’s unclear whether this is due to a “utilitarian” concern for the greater good 
or anti-social tendencies to accept instrumental harm; see Kahane et al. 2018). 
Greene also asserts, more controversially, that automatic moral intuitions are often 
inflexible and unreliable, at least when applied to novel moral problems to which the intuitions 
were not attuned. He argues, for example, that our automatic responses to sacrificial moral 
dilemmas inflexibly respond to how promoting the greater good requires pushing and other forms 
of “personal force” or “prototypical violence” (contrast Feltz & May 2017).  
However, ample evidence suggests that our automatic moral intuitions—like automatic 
responses in the Stroop task and our intuitive judgments of grammaticality—are frequently the 
product of sophisticated unconscious learning and reasoning over time (Mikhail 2011; Railton 
2017; May 2018a; Nichols 2021). Indeed, our automatic intuitions, both within and outside of the 
domain of ethics, are not fixed but rather malleable responses to changes in one’s environment and 
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circumstances. As we’ve seen, brain areas like the vmPFC and the amygdala used to be associated 
exclusively with basic emotional responses (e.g., fear), which is why in early work some dual-
process theorists identified automatic intuitions with emotions and controlled deliberation with 
reason (e.g. Greene et al. 2001; contrast Greene 2014). But it is now clear (see §3) that these 
circuits serve more general learning and inferential capacities. Affect plays a crucial role in these 
processes of learning and inference, but again such twinges of positive or negative thought, which 
are not always felt, are best construed as signals of significance, not emotions—let alone paradigm 
moral emotions, such as compassion or indignation. Thus, the least controversial aspects of the 
dual-process model suggest that when resolving dilemmas moral cognition, whether fast and slow, 
involves domain-general capacities.  
 
4.3 Moral vs. Non-Moral Statements 
The forgoing research in the neuroscience of ethics has received much attention and yet curiously 
focuses on rather specific kinds of moral judgment. Both approaches study only harm, leaving out 
other moral foundations, such as loyalty and fairness (see Graham et al. 2013; Parkinson et al. 
2011). It is remarkable, nevertheless, that we already see a similar cast of neural circuits cropping 
up in the two distinct lines of research. Moreover, another research paradigm provides even further 
converging evidence using a broader range of moral judgments.  
This series of neuroimaging studies attempted to identify which brain regions are more 
active when people assess statements about a range of moral phenomena, not sacrificial dilemmas 
and not exclusively situations involving harm (Moll et al. 2001; Moll et al. 2002). While in the 
brain scanner, participants judged as right or wrong:  
• moral statements (e.g., “The father never treated his son as a slave,” “The elderly are 
useless”),  
• non-moral statements (e.g., “The painter used his hand as a paintbrush,” “The elderly sleep 
more at night”), and  
• scrambled statements (e.g., “Sons push use eat work.”).  
Remarkably, the researchers found that the moral judgments primarily produced greater activity 
in our familiar set of neural circuits: portions of the prefrontal cortex, amygdala, temporoparietal 
junction, and cingulate. It’s striking that such different approaches and methods in moral 
neuroscience have zeroed in on roughly the same set of brain areas. 
 
5. The Defense of Rationalism 
Reviews of multiple studies and methods suggest that we are beginning to uncover a well-
corroborated picture of the moral brain (Moll et al. 2005; Greene 2009; Demaree-Cotton & Kahane 
2018; May et al. 2021). The circuits form a spatially distributed network that, at least provisionally, 
subserve some core forms of moral judgment (see Figure 1). But talk of “the moral brain” is merely 
a stylistic device. Rather than a distinct moral module, we see domain-general circuits that 
facilitate moral and prudential cognition (Arvan 2020) and much more still. 
Importantly for rationalism, the relevant areas are associated with a number of rational 
capacities, particularly: 
• Assigning learned values or rules to act types (amygdala) 
• Calculating the consequences of an action and integrating that information with general 
rules or heuristics (portions of the prefrontal cortex) 
• Computing the level of intent behind an action (temporoparietal junction). 
• Detecting conflicts and errors in one’s expectations (portions of the cingulate) 
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These are not just any set of domain-general capacities but ones we would antecedently expect to 
be applicable, even central, to moral cognition. Of course, these capacities deployed in moral 
judgment are rather automatic and unconscious. Do they genuinely facilitate reasoning or 
inference, rather than mere computation? Unfortunately, the scientific evidence doesn’t settle that 
thorny question. For our purposes, it is enough that these domain-general capacities aren’t 
associated with paradigm moral emotions and could very well involve or facilitate inference. It 
might seem implausible that rather automatic and unconscious processes facilitate inferential 
transitions among beliefs or belief-like states, but that is an increasingly prominent view among a 
range of philosophers, neuroscientists, and other cognitive scientists (see e.g. Hohwy 2013; 
Mandelbaum 2016; Buckner 2019). 
How do these circuits work together? Further research is needed, but some researchers 
have gained an understanding of the order in which such brain areas lead to moral judgment (at 
least of harmful acts), by using EEG. While participants wore an electrode-filled cap and viewed 
short videos of intentional versus accidental harms, researchers found that in a mere 60 
milliseconds participants inferred the agent’s mental states using the TPJ/pSTS (Decety & 
Cacioppo 2012). In another EEG study concerning both harmful and helpful acts, in just a few 
hundred milliseconds after activity in the TPJ/pSTS, the amygdala appears to provide evaluative 
input to areas of the prefrontal cortex, at which point a moral judgment is made (Yoder & Decety 
2014). As neuroimaging researchers have likewise found (Shenhav & Greene 2014), the amygdala 
seems to provide an assessment of the positive or negative value of the act in question, which the 
prefrontal cortex then integrates with information about harmful outcomes in order to make an 
overall moral judgment.   
 




Brain areas consistently activated when people make moral judgments. 
(Source: May et al. 2021) 
 
Compare this model of moral judgment with other more domain-specific cognitive 
functions. Sometimes damage to a neural circuit seems to impair rather specific capacities, such 
as the ability to identify animate but not inanimate objects. For instance, just months after traumatic 
brain injury or stroke, some patients struggle to name fruits and vegetables but not animals (see 
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patient P.S. in Caramazza & Shelton 1998: 3). We don’t tend to find such domain-specific deficits 
in moral cognition. Damage to the vmPFC might seem to selectively disrupt the normal ability to 
condemn instrumental harm—e.g., judging it inappropriate to kill one person as a means to saving 
five others (Koenigs et al. 2007). But a more complete picture of the evidence suggests that 
dysfunction in the vmPFC disrupts a more general-purpose learning mechanism and accordingly 
exhibits a wider range of deficits. Psychopaths and patients with “acquired sociopathy,” for 
example, don’t just provide abnormal moral judgments—and certainly not just a propensity to 
disvalue instrumental harm—but also deficits in prudence, recognizing others’ mental states, 
learning from punishment, and even deciding which kind of apples to buy at the grocery store.  
One upshot of this analysis is that it can be misleading to describe the dispute between 
sentimentalists and rationalists in terms of analogies with aesthetics and mathematics. These 
analogies are initially helpful in illustrating the two camps (Gill 2007). But we shouldn’t saddle 
rationalism with predicting, for example, that moral and aesthetic judgments won’t recruit similar 
brain areas (cf. Heinzelmann et al. 2020). The emerging neuroscience, as well as philosophical 
analysis of the dispute, suggests that rationalists needn’t make such predictions, given that affect 
facilitates inference (entanglement) and does so across the board, from mathematics and language 
to ethics and aesthetics (domain-generality).  
 
6. Conclusion 
Psychological versions of sentimentalism and rationalism do make empirical predictions and are 
thus partly accountable to scientific findings. I have argued that distinct lines of research in 
neuroscience are converging on a picture of moral circuitry in the brain that coheres well with 
moral rationalism. Novel forms of sentimentalism might also be made consistent with the data. 
Indeed, there is a sense in which our understanding of the human brain makes it difficult to 
distinguish modern forms of the two theories. Ultimately, rationalism might fare better than 
sentimentalism if we wish to sharply distinguish the two camps, though my primary aim has only 
been to show that a traditional form of rationalism remains defensible.  
The argument involved two main steps. The first step drew on studies of brain 
abnormalities and psychopathologies to show that inference and affect are entangled in moral 
cognition (as well as other domains). It may be tempting for a sentimentalist to point to the 
centrality of the amygdala and vmPFC and declare victory, given that these regions were 
traditionally associated with emotion. But we’re learning that these areas, although suffused with 
affect, subserve mechanisms for learning and reasoning. The second step of the argument focused 
on how circuits in the human brain contribute domain-general processes to neurotypical moral 
evaluation. A wide range of studies reveal a suite of spatially distributed neural circuits known to 
facilitate domain-general capacities, such as mind-reading and calculating consequences.  
Importantly, the neurobiological argument presented here draws on a broad range of 
evidence. We have not focused on a small set of provocative studies, one methodology, or work 
from a few labs using one paradigm. We’ve encountered evidence from neuroimaging, 
psychopathology, and even neurostimulation to provide evidence of causal relationships. 
Nevertheless, the model of the moral brain presented here is certainly provisional and incomplete. 
As I’ve stressed, most of the studies focus on harm and fairness, leaving other moral values under-
studied. Equally important to recognize, however, is how striking it is that roughly the same cast 
of circuits appears throughout diverse approaches to moral neuroscience. The cumulative 
evidence, I’ve argued, fits well with the rationalist tradition in moral psychology, which treats 
morality like other domains of thought in its deployment of domain-general reasoning capacities.  
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